ÿØÿà JFIF    ÿÛ „  ( %"1!%)+...383,7(-.+  -+++--++++---+-+-----+---------------+---+-++7-----ÿÀ  ß â" ÿÄ     ÿÄ H    !1AQaq"‘¡2B±ÁÑð#R“Ò Tbr‚²á3csƒ’ÂñDS¢³$CÿÄ   ÿÄ %  !1AQa"23‘ÿÚ   ? ôÿ ¨pŸªáÿ —åYõõ\?àÒü©ŠÄï¨pŸªáÿ —åYõõ\?àÓü©ŠÄá 0Ÿªáÿ Ÿå[úƒ ú®ði~TÁbqÐ8OÕpÿ ƒOò¤Oè`–RÂáœá™êi€ßÉ< FtŸI“öÌ8úDf´°å}“¾œ6  öFá°y¥jñÇh†ˆ¢ã/ÃÐ:ªcÈ "Y¡ðÑl>ÿ ”ÏËte:qž\oäŠe÷󲍷˜HT4&ÿ ÓÐü6ö®¿øþßèô Ÿ•7Ñi’•j|“ñì>b…þS?*Óôÿ ÓÐü*h¥£ír¶ü UãSç‚Ÿ[AÐaè[ûª•õ&õj?†Éö+EzP—WeÒírJFt ‘BŒ†Ï‡%#tE Øz ¥OÛ«!1›üä±Í™%ºÍãö]°î(–:@<‹ŒÊö×òÆt¦ãº+‡¦%ÌÁ²h´OƒJŒtMÜ>ÀÜÊw3Y´•牋4ǍýʏTì>œú=Íwhyë,¾Ôò×õ¿ßÊa»«þˆѪQ|%6ž™A õ%:øj<>É—ÿ Å_ˆCbõ¥š±ý¯Ýƒï…¶|RëócÍf溪“t.СøTÿ *Ä¿-{†çàczůŽ_–^XþŒ±miB[X±d 1,é”zEù»& î9gœf™9Ð'.;—™i}!ôšåîqêÛ٤ёý£½ÆA–àôe"A$˝Úsäÿ ÷Û #°xŸëí(l »ý3—¥5m! rt`†0~'j2(]S¦¦kv,ÚÇ l¦øJA£Šƒ J3E8ÙiŽ:cÉžúeZ°€¯\®kÖ(79«Ž:¯X”¾³Š&¡* ….‰Ž(ÜíŸ2¥ª‡×Hi²TF¤ò[¨íÈRëÉ䢍mgÑ.Ÿ<öäS0í„ǹÁU´f#Vß;Õ–…P@3ío<ä-±»Ž.L|kªÀê›fÂ6@»eu‚|ÓaÞÆŸ…¨ááå>åŠ?cKü6ùTÍÆ”†sĤÚ;H2RÚ†õ\Ö·Ÿn'¾ ñ#ºI¤Å´%çÁ­‚â7›‹qT3Iï¨ÖÚ5I7Ë!ÅOóŸ¶øÝñØôת¦$Tcö‘[«Ö³šÒ';Aþ ¸èíg A2Z"i¸vdÄ÷.iõ®§)¿]¤À†–‡É&ä{V¶iŽ”.Ó×Õÿ û?h¬Mt–íª[ÿ Ñÿ ÌV(í}=ibÔ¡›¥¢±b Lô¥‡piη_Z<‡z§èŒ)iÖwiÇ 2hÙ3·=’d÷8éŽ1¦¸c¤µ€7›7Ø ð\á)} ¹fËí›pAÃL%âc2 í§æQz¿;T8sæ°qø)QFMð‰XŒÂ±N¢aF¨…8¯!U  Z©RÊ ÖPVÄÀÍin™Ì-GˆªÅËŠ›•zË}º±ŽÍFò¹}Uw×#ä5B¤{î}Ð<ÙD é©¤&‡ïDbàÁôMÁ." ¤‡ú*õ'VŽ|¼´Úgllº¼klz[Æüï÷Aób‡Eÿ dÑ»Xx9ÃÜ£ÁT/`¼¸vI±Ýµ·Ë‚“G³þ*Ÿû´r|*}<¨îºœ @¦mÄ’M¹”.œ«Y–|6ÏU¤jç¥ÕÞqO ˜kDÆÁ¨5ÿ š;Њ¦¦€GÙk \ –Þ=â¼=SͧµªS°ÚÍpÜãQűÀõ¬?ÃÁ1Ñ•õZà?hóœ€ L¦l{Y*K˜Ù›zc˜–ˆâ ø+¾ ­-Ök¥%ùEÜA'}ˆ><ÊIè“bpÍ/qÞâvoX€w,\úªò6Z[XdÒæ­@Ö—€$òJí#é>'°Ú ôª˜<)4ryÙ£|óAÅn5žêŸyÒäMÝ2{"}‰–¤l÷ûWX\l¾Á¸góÉOÔ /óñB¤f¸çñ[.P˜ZsÊË*ßT܈§QN¢’¡¨§V¼(Üù*eÕ“”5T¨‹Âê¥FŒã½Dü[8'Ò¥a…Ú¶k7a *•›¼'Ò·\8¨ª\@\õ¢¦íq+DÙrmÎ…_ªæ»ŠÓœ¡¯’Ré9MÅ×D™lælffc+ŒÑ,ý™ÿ ¯þǤ=Å’Á7µ÷ÚÛ/“Ü€ñýã¼àí¾ÕÑ+ƒ,uµMâÀÄbm:ÒÎPæ{˜Gz[ƒ¯«® KHà`ßØŠéí¯P8Aq.C‰ à€kòpj´kN¶qô€…Õ,ÜNŠª-­{Zö’æû44‰sŽè‰îVíRœÕm" 6?³D9¡ÇTíÅꋇ`4«¸ÝÁô ï’ýorqКÇZ«x4Žâéþuïf¹µö[P ,Q£éaX±`PÉÍZ ¸äYúg üAx ’6Lê‚xÝÓ*äQ  Ï’¨hÍ =²,6ï#rÃ<¯–£»ƒ‹,–ê•€ aÛsñ'%Æ"®ÛüìBᝠHÚ3ß°©$“XnœÖ’î2ËTeûìxîß ¦å¿çÉ ðK§þ{‘t‚Ϋ¬jéîZ[ ”š7L¥4VÚCE×]m¤Øy”ä4-dz£œ§¸x.*ãÊÊ b÷•h:©‡¦s`BTÁRû¾g⻩‹jø sF¢àJøFl‘È•Xᓁà~*j¯ +(ÚÕ6-£¯÷GŠØy‚<Ç’.F‹Hœw(+)ÜÜâÈzÄäT§FߘãÏ;DmVœ3Àu@mÚüXÝü•3B¨òÌÁÛ<·ÃÜ z,Ì@õÅ·d2]ü8s÷IôÞ¯^Ç9¢u„~ëAŸï4«M? 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Documentation below. # This blocks local parts that begin with a dot or contain a quite # broad range of non-alphanumeric characters. .ifndef CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_LOCALPARTS CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_LOCALPARTS = ^[.] : ^.*[@%!/|`#&?] .endif .ifndef CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS = ^[./|] : ^.*[@%!`#&?] : ^.*/\\.\\./ .endif # This access control list is used for every RCPT command in an incoming # SMTP message. The tests are run in order until the address is either # accepted or denied. # acl_check_rcpt: # Accept if the source is local SMTP (i.e. not over TCP/IP). We do this by # testing for an empty sending host field. accept hosts = : control = dkim_disable_verify # Do not try to verify DKIM signatures of incoming mail if DC_minimaldns # or DISABLE_DKIM_VERIFY are set. .ifdef DC_minimaldns warn control = dkim_disable_verify .else .ifdef DISABLE_DKIM_VERIFY warn control = dkim_disable_verify .endif .endif # The following section of the ACL is concerned with local parts that contain # certain non-alphanumeric characters. Dots in unusual places are # handled by this ACL as well. # # Non-alphanumeric characters other than dots are rarely found in genuine # local parts, but are often tried by people looking to circumvent # relaying restrictions. Therefore, although they are valid in local # parts, these rules disallow certain non-alphanumeric characters, as # a precaution. # # Empty components (two dots in a row) are not valid in RFC 2822, but Exim # allows them because they have been encountered. (Consider local parts # constructed as "firstinitial.secondinitial.familyname" when applied to # a name without a second initial.) However, a local part starting # with a dot or containing /../ can cause trouble if it is used as part of a # file name (e.g. for a mailing list). This is also true for local parts that # contain slashes. A pipe symbol can also be troublesome if the local part is # incorporated unthinkingly into a shell command line. # # These ACL components will block recipient addresses that are valid # from an RFC5322 point of view. We chose to have them blocked by # default for security reasons. # # If you feel that your site should have less strict recipient # checking, please feel free to change the default values of the macros # defined in main/01_exim4-config_listmacrosdefs or override them from a # local configuration file. # # Two different rules are used. The first one has a quite strict # default, and is applied to messages that are addressed to one of the # local domains handled by this host. # The default value of CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_LOCALPARTS is defined # at the top of this file. .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_LOCALPARTS deny domains = +local_domains local_parts = CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_LOCALPARTS message = restricted characters in address .endif # The second rule applies to all other domains, and its default is # considerably less strict. # The default value of CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS is defined in # main/01_exim4-config_listmacrosdefs: # CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS = ^[./|] : ^.*[@%!`#&?] : ^.*/\\.\\./ # It allows local users to send outgoing messages to sites # that use slashes and vertical bars in their local parts. It blocks # local parts that begin with a dot, slash, or vertical bar, but allows # these characters within the local part. However, the sequence /../ is # barred. The use of some other non-alphanumeric characters is blocked. # Single quotes might probably be dangerous as well, but they're # allowed by the default regexps to avoid rejecting mails to Ireland. # The motivation here is to prevent local users (or local users' malware) # from mounting certain kinds of attack on remote sites. .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS deny domains = !+local_domains local_parts = CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS message = restricted characters in address .endif # Accept mail to postmaster in any local domain, regardless of the source, # and without verifying the sender. # accept .ifndef CHECK_RCPT_POSTMASTER local_parts = postmaster .else local_parts = CHECK_RCPT_POSTMASTER .endif domains = +local_domains : +relay_to_domains # Deny unless the sender address can be verified. # # This is disabled by default so that DNSless systems don't break. If # your system can do DNS lookups without delay or cost, you might want # to enable this feature. # # This feature does not work in smarthost and satellite setups as # with these setups all domains pass verification. See spec.txt section # "Access control lists" subsection "Address verification" with the added # information that a smarthost/satellite setup routes all non-local e-mail # to the smarthost. .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_VERIFY_SENDER deny message = Sender verification failed !acl = acl_local_deny_exceptions !verify = sender .endif # Verify senders listed in local_sender_callout with a callout. # # In smarthost and satellite setups, this causes the callout to be # done to the smarthost. Verification will thus only be reliable if the # smarthost does reject illegal addresses in the SMTP dialog. deny !acl = acl_local_deny_exceptions senders = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_sender_callout}\ {CONFDIR/local_sender_callout}\ {}} !verify = sender/callout # Accept if the message comes from one of the hosts for which we are an # outgoing relay. It is assumed that such hosts are most likely to be MUAs, # so we set control=submission to make Exim treat the message as a # submission. It will fix up various errors in the message, for example, the # lack of a Date: header line. If you are actually relaying out out from # MTAs, you may want to disable this. If you are handling both relaying from # MTAs and submissions from MUAs you should probably split them into two # lists, and handle them differently. # Recipient verification is omitted here, because in many cases the clients # are dumb MUAs that don't cope well with SMTP error responses. If you are # actually relaying out from MTAs, you should probably add recipient # verification here. # Note that, by putting this test before any DNS black list checks, you will # always accept from these hosts, even if they end up on a black list. The # assumption is that they are your friends, and if they get onto black # list, it is a mistake. accept hosts = +relay_from_hosts control = submission/sender_retain control = dkim_disable_verify # Accept if the message arrived over an authenticated connection, from # any host. Again, these messages are usually from MUAs, so recipient # verification is omitted, and submission mode is set. And again, we do this # check before any black list tests. accept authenticated = * control = submission/sender_retain control = dkim_disable_verify # Insist that a HELO/EHLO was accepted. require message = nice hosts say HELO first condition = ${if def:sender_helo_name} # Insist that any other recipient address that we accept is either in one of # our local domains, or is in a domain for which we explicitly allow # relaying. Any other domain is rejected as being unacceptable for relaying. require message = relay not permitted domains = +local_domains : +relay_to_domains # We also require all accepted addresses to be verifiable. This check will # do local part verification for local domains, but only check the domain # for remote domains. require verify = recipient # Verify recipients listed in local_rcpt_callout with a callout. # This is especially handy for forwarding MX hosts (secondary MX or # mail hubs) of domains that receive a lot of spam to non-existent # addresses. The only way to check local parts for remote relay # domains is to use a callout (add /callout), but please read the # documentation about callouts before doing this. deny !acl = acl_local_deny_exceptions recipients = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_rcpt_callout}\ {CONFDIR/local_rcpt_callout}\ {}} !verify = recipient/callout # CONFDIR/local_sender_blacklist holds a list of envelope senders that # should have their access denied to the local host. Incoming messages # with one of these senders are rejected at RCPT time. # # The explicit white lists are honored as well as negative items in # the black list. See exim4-config_files(5) for details. deny message = sender envelope address $sender_address is locally blacklisted here. If you think this is wrong, get in touch with postmaster log_message = sender envelope address is locally blacklisted. !acl = acl_local_deny_exceptions senders = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_sender_blacklist}\ {CONFDIR/local_sender_blacklist}\ {}} # deny bad sites (IP address) # CONFDIR/local_host_blacklist holds a list of host names, IP addresses # and networks (CIDR notation) that should have their access denied to # The local host. Messages coming in from a listed host will have all # RCPT statements rejected. # # The explicit white lists are honored as well as negative items in # the black list. See exim4-config_files(5) for details. deny message = sender IP address $sender_host_address is locally blacklisted here. If you think this is wrong, get in touch with postmaster log_message = sender IP address is locally blacklisted. !acl = acl_local_deny_exceptions hosts = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_host_blacklist}\ {CONFDIR/local_host_blacklist}\ {}} # Warn if the sender host does not have valid reverse DNS. # # If your system can do DNS lookups without delay or cost, you might want # to enable this. # If sender_host_address is defined, it's a remote call. If # sender_host_name is not defined, then reverse lookup failed. Use # this instead of !verify = reverse_host_lookup to catch deferrals # as well as outright failures. .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_REVERSE_DNS warn condition = ${if and{{def:sender_host_address}{!def:sender_host_name}}\ {yes}{no}} add_header = X-Host-Lookup-Failed: Reverse DNS lookup failed for $sender_host_address (${if eq{$host_lookup_failed}{1}{failed}{deferred}}) .endif # Use spfquery to perform a pair of SPF checks. # # This is quite costly in terms of DNS lookups (~6 lookups per mail). Do not # enable if that's an issue. Also note that if you enable this, you must # install "spf-tools-perl" which provides the spfquery command. # Missing spf-tools-perl will trigger the "Unexpected error in # SPF check" warning. .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_SPF deny message = [SPF] $sender_host_address is not allowed to send mail from \ ${if def:sender_address_domain {$sender_address_domain}{$sender_helo_name}}. log_message = SPF check failed. !acl = acl_local_deny_exceptions condition = ${run{/usr/bin/spfquery.mail-spf-perl --ip \ ${quote:$sender_host_address} --identity \ ${if def:sender_address_domain \ {--scope mfrom --identity ${quote:$sender_address}}\ {--scope helo --identity ${quote:$sender_helo_name}}}}\ {no}{${if eq {$runrc}{1}{yes}{no}}}} defer message = Temporary DNS error while checking SPF record. Try again later. !acl = acl_local_deny_exceptions condition = ${if eq {$runrc}{5}{yes}{no}} warn condition = ${if <={$runrc}{6}{yes}{no}} add_header = Received-SPF: ${if eq {$runrc}{0}{pass}\ {${if eq {$runrc}{2}{softfail}\ {${if eq {$runrc}{3}{neutral}\ {${if eq {$runrc}{4}{permerror}\ {${if eq {$runrc}{6}{none}{error}}}}}}}}}\ } client-ip=$sender_host_address; \ ${if def:sender_address_domain \ {envelope-from=${sender_address}; }{}}\ helo=$sender_helo_name warn log_message = Unexpected error in SPF check. condition = ${if >{$runrc}{6}{yes}{no}} .endif # Check against classic DNS "black" lists (DNSBLs) which list # sender IP addresses .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_IP_DNSBLS warn dnslists = CHECK_RCPT_IP_DNSBLS add_header = X-Warning: $sender_host_address is listed at $dnslist_domain ($dnslist_value: $dnslist_text) log_message = $sender_host_address is listed at $dnslist_domain ($dnslist_value: $dnslist_text) .endif # Check against DNSBLs which list sender domains, with an option to locally # whitelist certain domains that might be blacklisted. # # Note: If you define CHECK_RCPT_DOMAIN_DNSBLS, you must append # "/$sender_address_domain" after each domain. For example: # CHECK_RCPT_DOMAIN_DNSBLS = rhsbl.foo.org/$sender_address_domain \ # : rhsbl.bar.org/$sender_address_domain .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_DOMAIN_DNSBLS warn !senders = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_domain_dnsbl_whitelist}\ {CONFDIR/local_domain_dnsbl_whitelist}\ {}} dnslists = CHECK_RCPT_DOMAIN_DNSBLS add_header = X-Warning: $sender_address_domain is listed at $dnslist_domain ($dnslist_value: $dnslist_text) log_message = $sender_address_domain is listed at $dnslist_domain ($dnslist_value: $dnslist_text) .endif # This hook allows you to hook in your own ACLs without having to # modify this file. If you do it like we suggest, you'll end up with # a small performance penalty since there is an additional file being # accessed. This doesn't happen if you leave the macro unset. .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_ACL_FILE .include CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_ACL_FILE .endif ############################################################################# # This check is commented out because it is recognized that not every # sysadmin will want to do it. If you enable it, the check performs # Client SMTP Authorization (csa) checks on the sending host. These checks # do DNS lookups for SRV records. The CSA proposal is currently (May 2005) # an Internet draft. You can, of course, add additional conditions to this # ACL statement to restrict the CSA checks to certain hosts only. # # require verify = csa ############################################################################# # Accept if the address is in a domain for which we are an incoming relay, # but again, only if the recipient can be verified. accept domains = +relay_to_domains endpass verify = recipient # At this point, the address has passed all the checks that have been # configured, so we accept it unconditionally. accept